
Strait of Hormuz: Can Alternative Routes Ensure Stable Oil and Gas Supplies from the Gulf?
Image source, Getty Images
Tensions between Iran and the United States have once again brought the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most critical maritime trade routes, into the global spotlight.
Following an interim agreement aimed at resolving the conflict within a month, both nations have resumed confrontations, causing oil prices to rise in international markets.
If navigating ships through the Strait of Hormuz becomes too risky, what are the prospects for Gulf oil and gas exporters to deliver their products to the global market via alternative maritime routes?
Experts say that although some alternative routes exist, none currently can fully replace the strategic importance and capacity of the Strait of Hormuz.
Why Hormuz Matters
Image source, EPA
The narrow maritime passage between Iran and Oman—the Strait of Hormuz—is the primary transit point for most oil and gas exports produced in the Gulf region. Its high capacity, flexibility, and relatively low cost underpin its importance.
Compared to pipelines, oil tankers can transport larger volumes at lower cost. The construction and operation of pipelines require significant infrastructure and ongoing maintenance.
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), approximately 20 million barrels of oil and petroleum products are shipped daily through the Strait of Hormuz, representing about a quarter of the world’s seaborne oil trade. Roughly 80% of this oil is destined for Asian markets. Nearly one-fifth of the world’s total liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports are also shipped via this route.
Dependence on LNG exports is even greater. Qatar, one of the largest LNG exporters globally, relies heavily on this route to supply international markets. At present, there are no major alternative routes readily available to replace Qatar’s LNG exports.
Existing Alternative Routes
Given the strategic influence of the Strait of Hormuz on global energy markets, Gulf oil-producing nations have invested in alternative infrastructure projects over the years to reduce dependence on this single route.
The largest of these is Saudi Arabia’s East-West petroleum pipeline, commonly known as the “Petroline.” Stretching about 1,200 kilometers, it links the oil-rich eastern fields of Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea port of Yanbu.
Constructed during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s when both countries targeted oil tankers and commercial ships in the Gulf, the pipeline was later upgraded in 2019 to handle up to 7 million barrels per day in emergencies.
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has also developed an alternative route. The 406-kilometer Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline connects the Habshan oil fields in Abu Dhabi to the port of Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman, enabling oil exports without passing through the Strait of Hormuz.
According to the Financial Times, DP World, the Dubai-based port operator, is in talks to develop a new multi-purpose port and additional terminals at Fujairah. This aims to reduce reliance on Dubai’s main trading hub, Jebel Ali, and enhance maritime access outside the Strait of Hormuz.
The main challenge remains capacity. Alternative routes can transfer between 3.5 to 5.5 million barrels per day, significantly less than the approximately 20 million barrels transported daily through the Strait of Hormuz.
David B Roberts, Associate Professor at King’s College London, notes, “That is still not enough.”
Geographical limitations reduce the utility of alternative routes. For instance, the Yanbu terminals were not designed for rapid large-scale oil transportation.
Both routes have faced attacks. In March, the UAE accused Iran of arson at oil storage facilities in Fujairah, disrupting loading operations.
Due to infrastructure limitations and international sanctions, the capacity of alternative routes has not yet been significantly increased.
Future Export Routes
Image source, Reuters
Efforts are underway to find new export routes to reduce dependence on the Strait of Hormuz.
One such project is the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline. Stretching nearly 960 kilometers, it transports oil from Kirkuk in northern Iraq to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan.
The pipeline was shut down for about two and a half years but resumed operations in September 2025, reaching a daily capacity of around 250,000 barrels by March 2026. Though it provides an alternative route for Iraq, its capacity is small relative to the country’s total oil export volume.
Iraq exports roughly 3.4 million barrels of crude oil daily, with 95% passing through its southern port Basra and transiting the Strait of Hormuz to reach global markets.
Another potential alternative is the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline that would deliver Iraqi oil through the Gulf to Syria’s Mediterranean coast.
The ambitious “Four Seas Project” proposes building transportation and energy networks connecting the Mediterranean, Black Sea, Caspian Sea, and Arabian Gulf through Syria and Turkey.
Efforts are also being made to revive the Basra-Aqaba pipeline proposal from 1983, intended to transport Iraqi oil to Jordan’s Red Sea port. Political and financial challenges have repeatedly stalled this project.
Proponents believe these alternative routes would mitigate disruptions in the Gulf area and reduce Iran’s influence over global energy supplies.
However, senior analyst Huzaeir Ezekiel Julhasham of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore cautions that such projects could create new dependencies.
“These routes would give non-energy producing transit countries greater control over energy trade,” he wrote.
He added that this would provide countries like Turkey with greater strategic leverage in the energy market.
Security challenges remain paramount. Julhasham points out that routes through Iraq or Syria remain vulnerable to regional instability, militant group activities, and attacks on energy infrastructure.
Beyond Hormuz
Image source, Reuters
Although Gulf oil and gas exporters seek to reduce dependence on the Strait of Hormuz, geopolitical risks associated with alternative routes prevent them from becoming fully independent.
For example, Egypt’s SUMED pipeline connects the Red Sea to the Mediterranean, bypassing the Suez Canal, and serves as an alternative route for exporting oil to Europe with a daily capacity of 2.5 to 2.8 million barrels.
Attacks by Houthi rebels on the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb Strait have underscored risks impacting the entire Suez transit system.
Iranian Revolutionary Guards have warned that the Strait of Hormuz could remain closed and disrupt other oil and gas export routes in the Gulf unless U.S. aggression ceases.
Reduced Dependence on Hormuz?
According to H A Heller, Middle East expert at the UK think tank Royal United Services Institute, Gulf countries are increasingly working to lessen their reliance on the Strait of Hormuz.
“Gulf Arab states intend to minimize risks associated with the Strait of Hormuz as much as possible in the future,” he said.
Heller adds they cannot rely on the Strait of Hormuz as before and are likely to continue developing alternative routes, though these will not fully replace Hormuz.
“No single route will fully replace another.”
As countries seek to reduce dependence on any regional power, the Strait of Hormuz’s strategic significance is expected to decline.
“These nations do not want Israeli dominance in the region, nor do they wish to remain under Iranian control,” he noted.