
Strait of Hormuz: A More Powerful Strategic Asset for Iran than Nuclear Capability
Following a 40-day conflict involving Iran, the United States, and Israel, an unusual conclusion has emerged: for Iran, control over the Strait of Hormuz may be a more potent strategic weapon than its nuclear capacity. From the outset, this conflict was viewed as an attempt to overthrow Iran’s regime through intense bombing and targeted strikes on key leaders and critical sites. In response, Iran launched missile and drone attacks against American partners in the Gulf region. Facing increased military pressure, Iran shifted its focus to disrupting transit through the narrow waterway connecting the Persian Gulf to global markets. This quickly placed significant pressure on U.S. allies, who heavily rely on uninterrupted oil and gas supplies.
Officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have come to understand that controlling the waterway provides far greater strategic benefits than conventional military operations. By threatening the global energy supply, Iran has compelled the United States to reconsider its policies. Ultimately, ensuring the reopening and securing of the Strait became a key condition in U.S. negotiations. Despite threats to close the waterway in the event of attacks, Iran had never fully blocked passage before. Even during the Iran-Iraq war from 1980 to 1988, despite assaults on oil tankers, the Strait remained open.
Currently, some Iranian commanders and officials are discussing the future of Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz. A draft proposal from the Iranian parliament’s National Security Commission includes levying fees on vessels passing through the waterway. One parliamentarian stated that Iran intends to charge one dollar per every three barrels of oil transported. Following the ceasefire, Iranian state media have hinted at a victory. The Iranian embassy in Kuwait posted a video titled “When Allah’s Victory Comes,” referencing Iran’s former supreme leader.
The IRGC-affiliated Fars News Agency stated, “The ceasefire plan includes the lifting of economic sanctions, compensation for war damages, and the withdrawal of U.S. forces.” Senior Iranian officials have echoed similar sentiments. A spokesperson for Iran’s Vice President referenced the early deaths of supreme leader Ali Khamenei supporters during the war, describing the outcome as a victory for the “Khamenei Doctrine.” However, this claim of victory seems weaker against the harsh realities on the ground. The Iranian military has sustained significant losses. Long-standing U.S. economic sanctions have further weakened an already fragile economy. During the course of the war, at least thirteen individuals have been sentenced to death.
These developments reveal deep internal dissent within Iran’s institutions. While the United States’ main demand after the ceasefire was reopening the waterway for navigation and operation, fulfilling this demand appears complex. On Wednesday, Iran warned that any vessel attempting to pass through the Strait without IRGC approval would be “targeted and destroyed.” White House Press Secretary Caroline Levitt indicated that President Trump has been briefed on this “unacceptable” situation. On Thursday, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Saeed Khatibzadeh stated in an interview that Iran would “secure safe passage” through the waterway, emphasizing that the Strait has been open for thousands of years, long before U.S. interventions.
However, he added, “Only when the U.S. ceases its aggressions will the waterway be reopened,” possibly alluding to Israel’s recent attacks on Lebanon. Khatibzadeh also asserted Iran’s commitment to “abide by international norms and laws,” but claimed that, since the Strait does not fall within international maritime zones, its safe passage depends on “the goodwill between Iran and Oman.” Notably, the waterway is governed by international maritime law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which oversees the security of non-military maritime traffic.